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Abstract: In this paper, a geometric function is introduced to reflect the attenuation speed
of impact of one firm’s default to its partner. If two firms are competitions (copartners), the
default intensity of one firm will decrease (increase) abruptly when the other firm defaults.
As time goes on, the impact will decrease gradually until extinct. In this model, the joint
distribution and marginal distributions of default times are derived by employing the change
of measure, so can we value the fair swap premium of a CDS.
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1. Introduction
The rapid expansion in recent years of market for the credit derivatives had led to a growing
interest in the valuation of these instruments including the credit default swaps(CDS).The refer-
ence issuers and the derivative issuers not only have default risk, but also correlate in some way.
As remarked by Jarrow and Yu (2001),”an investigation of counterparty risk is incomplete with-
out studying its impact on the pricing of credit derivatives”. We can distinguish three different
approaches to model default correlation in the literature of intensity credit risk modeling. The
first approach to model default correlation makes use of copula functions. A copula is a function
that links univariate marginal distributions to the joint multivariate distribution with auxiliary
correlating variables. Li (2000) was probably the first to explicitly use the concept of copulas in
the context of basket default derivatives pricing.
The second approach introduces correlation in firms’ default intensities making them dependent
on a set of common variables Xt and on a firm specific factor. These models have received the
name of conditionally independent defaults (CID) models, because conditioned to the realization
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of the state variables Xt the firm’s default intensities are independent as are the default times that
they generate. for example Duffie and Singleton (1999) and Lando (1994, 1998).
The last approach to model default correlation, contagion models, relies on the works by Davis
and Lo (1999) and Jarrow and Yu (2001). It is based on the idea of default contagion in which,
when a firm defaults, the default intensities of related firms jump upwards. Leung and Kwok (2005)
gave the analytic solution for the CDS premium for Jarrow and Yu (2001)model by employing the
change of measure which was introduced in Collin-Dufresne (2004). But it is unrealistic for them to
assume that one firm’s default intensity keep a constant jump after the other firm defaults. In this
paper, we introduce a geometric function to reflect the attenuation impact of one firm’s default to
other firms’ default intensities. In our model, one firm’s default will influence other firms’ default
intensities and the impact will decrease until extinct as time goes on. That is to say after a period
of time, one firm’s default intensity will depend the firm itself while the impact of other firm’s
default will disappear. The model is more realistic.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce a geometric function to reflect
the attenuation impact of one firm’s default to its partners, and give emphasis on the case when
the two firms are competitions. The joint and marginal distributions of the two firms’ default
times are got by employing the change of measure which was introduced in Collin-Dufresne (2004).
In section 3, we price the CDS premium using the conclusion of section 2 and get the analytic
solution. The paper is ended with conclusion in the last section.
2. A Model for Dependent Default with Geometric Attenuation function
We consider an uncertain economy with a time horizon of T ∗ described by a filtered space
(Ω,F , {Ft}
T∗
t=0, P ) satisfying F = FT∗ , whereP is the risk-neutral(equivalent martingale) measure
in the sense of Harison and Kreps (1981), that is, all security prices discounted by the risk-free
interest rate rt are martingale under P.
In this section, we construct a two-firm model with default correlation. Suppose firm B and
firm C have high direct linkage which are competitions or copartners. The default time of firm i
(i=B,C) is denoted by τ i which posses a strictly positive Ft-predictable intensity process λ
i
t with
right-continuous sample paths. If we define N it = I(τ i≤t) as the default indicator function which
equals to 0 before firm i defaults and 1 otherwise.
Let Ht = σ(N
B
s , 0 ≤ s ≤ t) ∨ σ(N
C
s , 0 ≤ s ≤ t), then we can get that
M it = N
i
t −
∫ tΛτ i
0
λisds (1)
is an Ft-local martingale and the conditional survival probability of firm i is given by
P (τ i > T |Ht ∨ Ft) = I(τ i>t)E[exp(−
∫ T
t
λisds)|Ft]. (2)
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The default correlation between firm B and firm C is characterized by the correlated default
intensities:
λBt = b0 + I(τC≤t)
b1
b2(t− τC) + 1
, (3)
λCt = c0 + I(τB≤t)
c1
c2(t− τB) + 1
, (4)
where b0, c0, b2, c2 are nonnegative real numbers, and b1, c1 are real numbers satisfying b0+ b1 >
0, c0 + c1 > 0. In this model, the default of firm C(B) will bring abrupt change to the default
intensity of firm B(C). If B is one competition (copartner) of firm C, b1 < 0(> 0), and when firm
C defaults, the default intensity λBt jumps by the amount of |b1| from b0 to b0 + b1. As time
goes on, the impulsion effect will attenuate until extinct with geometric speed, that is to say, λBt
will come back to b0 at last. This explanation is the same as C is one competition(copartner) of
firm B. Parameters b0 and c0 are the firm-specific default intensity. Parameters b1 and c1 reflect
the impact intensities of counterparty’s default, and when b1 = 0 and c1 = 0, firm B and firm C
are default-independent. Parameters b2 and c2 are non-negative real numbers, which reflect the
attenuation speed. When b2 = 0 and c2 = 0, the model becomes the one in Jarrow and Yu (2001)
and Yuen and Yue (2005).
To calculate the joint distribution of the two default time of firm B and firm C in [0, T ](T < T ∗),
we adopt the change of measure introduced by Collin-Dufresne (2004), defining a firm-specific
probability measure P i which puts zero probability on the pathes where default occurs prior to
the maturity T. Specifically, the change of measure is defined by
ZiT
.
=
dP i
dP
∣∣∣∣
σ(HT∨FT )
= I(τ i>T ) exp(
∫ T
0
λisds), (5)
where P i is a firm-specific(firm i) probability measure which is absolutely continuous with respect to
P on the stochastic interval [τ i,+∞). To proceed the calculation under the measure P i, we enlarge
the filtration to Gi = (Git)t≥0 as the completion of σ(Ht ∨Ft)t≥0 by the null set of the probability
measure P i. One can show that ZiT is a uniformly integrable P-martingale with respect to G
i
T and
almost surely strictly positive on [0, τ i) and almost surely strictly equals to zero on [τ i,+∞)(see
Collin-Dufresne (2004)).
Under the default risk structure specified in Eqs.(3) and (4), the survival probabilities of firm B
and firm C are defined recursively through each other and this leads to the phenomenon of ”looping
default”. Under the new measure PB defined by Eq.(5), λCt = c0 for t < τ
C , this effectively neglect
the impact of firm B’s default on the intensity of firm C, and looping default no longer exists. An
analogous argument also holds under the measure PC .
Proposition 1 When −b1 = b2 = b > 0 and −c1 = c2 = c > 0, the joint distribution of
default times (τB , τC) with the default intensities defined by Eqs.(3) and(4) on [0, T ] × [0, T ] is
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found to be
P (τB > t1, τ
C > t2) =
{
c(t2 − t1 +
1
c
− 1
b0
)e−b0t1−c0t2 + c
b0
e−(b0+c0)t2 , for t1 ≤ t2 ≤ T
b(t1 − t2 +
1
b
− 1
c0
)e−b0t1−c0t2 + b
c0
e−(b0+c0)t1 , for t2 < t1 ≤ T,
(6)
and the joint density is
f(t1, t2) =
{
cb0c0[(t2 − t1) +
1
c
− 1
c0
]e−b0t1−c0t2 , for t1 ≤ t2 ≤ T
bb0c0[(t1 − t2) +
1
b
− 1
b0
]e−b0t1−c0t2 , for t2 < t1 ≤ T.
(7)
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Proof:
If t2 ≤ t1 ≤ T ,
(τB > t1, τ
C > t2) ∈ Ht1 ⊂ G
B
t1
. (8)
So we can get
P (τB > t1, τ
C > t2)
= EB[I(τB>t2) exp{−
∫ t1
0
(b0 + I(τC≤t)
−b1
(t−τC+1)b2
dt)}]
= EB
{
I(τC>t2)e
−b0t1 exp{−b1I(τC≤t1) −
∫ t1
τC
1
(t−τC+1)b2
dt}
}
If b2 6= 1, the above equation equals to
= e−b0t1EB[I(t2<τC≤t1) exp{
−b1
1−b2
[(t1 − τ
C + 1)1−b2 − 1] + I(τC>t1)]
= exp{−b0t1 −
b1
1−b2
}[
∫ t1
t2
c0e
−c0t[b(t1 − t) + 1]bt+ e
−c0t1 ]
= b(t1 − t2 +
1
b
− 1
c0
)e−c0t2−b0t1 + b
c0
e−(c0+b0)t1
= EB
{
I(τC>t2)e
−b0t1 exp{I(τC≤t1) ln[b(t1 − τ
C) + 1]}
}
= e−b0t1EB[I(t2<τC≤t1)(b(t1 − τ
C) + 1) + I(τC>t1)]
= e−b0t1 [
∫ t1
t2
c0e
−c0t[b(t1 − t) + 1]bt+ e
−c0t1 ]
= b(t1 − t2 +
1
b
− 1
c0
)e−c0t2−b0t1 + b
c0
e−(c0+b0)t1 ,
(9)
where EC denotes the expectation under the measure PC . The first equation follows from the
definition of PC , and the fourth from the fact that λBt = b0 for t < t2 under P
C . By a similar
argument for t2 ≤ t1 ≤ T , the joint distribution is given by
P (τB > t1, τ
C > t2) = b(t1 − t2 +
1
b
−
1
c0
)e−b0t1−c0t2 +
b
c0
e−(b0+c0)t1 . (10)
The differentiation of P (τB > t1, τ
C > t2) with respect to t1 and t2 gives the joint density of the
default times
f(t1, t2) =
∂2P (τB > t1, τ
C > t2)
∂t1∂t2
=
{
cb0c0[t2 − t1 +
1
c
− 1
c0
]e−b0t1−c0t2 , for t1 < t2 ≤ T
bb0c0[t1 − t2 +
1
b
− 1
b0
]e−b0t1−c0t2 , for t2 < t1 ≤ T,
(11)
The proof is completed.♯
Remark 1 It is worth noting that if cb0 6= bc0, then f(t1, t2) is not continuous on the plane
t1 = t2.
Corollary 1 Under the assumption of Proposition 1, if b1 = c1 = 0, then the joint distribution
of default times (τB , τC) with the default intensity defined by Eq.(3)(4) on [0, T ]× [0, T ] is
P (τB > t1, τ
C > t2) = e
−b0t1−c0t2 , (12)
in other words, when b1 = c1 = 0, (τ
B , τC) are default-independent on [0, T ]× [0, T ].
Proof We can get (11) by taking limit in Eq.(9) or Eq. (10) as c→ 0+. ♯
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Corollary 2 If −b1 = b2 = b > 0,−c1 = c2 = c > 0, the marginal distributions of τ
B , τC on
[0, T ] are given by
P (τB > t1) = e
−b0t1 +
b
c0
e−b0t1 [e−c0t1 − 1 + c0t1], t1 ≤ T (13)
P (τC > t2) = e
−c0t2 +
c
b0
e−c0t2 [e−b0t2 − 1 + b0t2], t2 ≤ T. (14)
Proof We can get Eqs.(13) and (14) by taking t1 = 0 and t2 = 0 in Eqs.(9) and (10)
respectively. ♯
Remark 2 The first term in Eq.(13) denotes the firm-specific survival probability, and the
second one denotes the increment of firm B’s survival probability because of the default of firm C
and the geometric attenuation speed. As the result of
e−c0t1 − 1 + c0t1 ≤
1
2
c20t
2
1,
the increment of firm B’s survival probability satisfies
b
c0
e−b0t1 [e−c0t1 − 1 + c0t1] ≤
1
2
bc0t
2
1e
−b0t1 ≤
{
2c0
b0
e−2 for 2
b0
≤ T,
1
2bc0T
2e−b0T for 2
b0
> T.
From the above inequation we can get that the increment of firm B’s survival probability at time
t will be no more than 12bc0t
2
1e
−b0t1 . An analogous argument also holds for firm C.
Section 3 CDS Valuation in the Model of Dependent Default
with Geometric Attenuation function
In this section we use the conclusion of Section 2 to price the premium of a CDS. A CDS
is a contract agreement between protection buyer and seller, in which the protection buyer pays
periodically to the protection seller a fixed amount fee(swap premium pr spread) asking for a
payment when the reference asset defaults. A institute can use a CDS to transfer, elude and hedge
the credit risk of a risky asset(or basket of risky assets) from one party to the other. So a CDS is
a very important instrument to manage credit risk.
Suppose interest rate rt is a constant r. Assume that party A holds a corporate bond and
faces the credit risk arising from default of the bond issuer (reference party C). To seek protection
against such default risk, party A enters a CDS contract in which he agrees to make a stream of
periodic premium payments, known as the swap premium to party B (CDS protection seller). In
exchange, party B promises to compensate A (CDS protection buyer) for its loss in the event of
default of the bond (reference asset). Without loss of generality, we take the notional to be $ 1
and assume zero recovery under default. Firm B pays firm A after a settlement period δ when the
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reference asset c defaults. Furthermore in Leung and Kwok (2005), they conclude the expression
for the swap premium has little dependence on the default intensity of the protection buyer, so we
impose that during the entire contract, firm A doesn’t default.
The default intensity processes of firm B and C are given by Eqs.(3) and (4) in special cases
λBt = b0 − I(τC≤t)
b
b(t− τC) + 1
, (3)
λCt = c0 − I(τB≤t)
c
c(t− τB) + 1
. (4)
Since it takes no cost to enter a CDS, the value of the swap premium S(T ) is determined by∑n
i=1 E[e
−rTiS(T )I(τB
V
τC>Ti)] + S(T )A(T )
= E[e−r(τ
C+δ)I(τC≤T )I(τB>τ+δ)]
(15)
where {T1, . . . , Tn} are the swap payment dates with 0 = T0 < T1 < . . . < Tn = T, Ti − Ti−1 =
∆T, T + δ < T ∗, and δ is the length of settlement period. Here τC + δ represents the settlement
date at the end of the settlement period. The first term in Eq.(15) gives the present value of
the sum of periodic swap payments(determined when either B or C defaults or at maturity) and
S(T )A(T ) is the present value of the accrued swap premium for the fraction of period between τC
and the last payment date. The present value of accrued swap premium is given by
S(T )A(T ) = S(T )
n∑
i=1
E[e−rτ
C τC − Ti−1
∆T
I(Ti−1<τC≤Ti)I(τB>τC)]. (16)
In the following, we will calculate all the expectations in Eq.(16). For simplicity we denote
β := b0 + c0 + r.
It is easy to get from Eq.(6)
E[I(τB
V
τC>Ti)] = P (τ
B > Ti, τ
C > Ti) = e
−(b0+c0)Ti , (17)
So
n∑
i=1
E[e−rTiS(T )I(τB
V
τC>Ti)] = S(T )
e−β∆T (1− e−βT )
1− e−β∆T
. (18)
From Eq.(11) it can be found
E[e−r(τ
C+δ)I(τC≤T )I(τB>τC+δ)]
=
∫ T
0
∫ +∞
t2+δ
e−r(t2+δ)bb0c0[t1 − t2+
1
b
− 1
b0
]e−b0t1−c0t2dt1dt2
= bc0
β
(1
b
+ δ)e−(r+b0)δ[1− e−βT ]
(19)
and
E[e−rτ
C τC−Ti−1
∆T I(Ti−1<τC≤Ti)I(τB>τC)]
=
∫ Ti
Ti−1
∫ +∞
t2
e−rt2
t2−Ti−1
∆T bb0c0[t1 − t2 +
1
b
− 1
b0
]e−b0t1−c0t2dt1dt2
= c0
β∆T [Ti−1e
−βTi−1 − Tie
−βTi + (Ti−1 −
1
β
)(e−βTi − e−βTi−1)].
(20)
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So
S(T )A(T ) = S(T ) c0
β∆T [
∑n
i=1(Ti−1e
βTi−1 − Tie
βTi)
+
∑n
i=1 Ti−1(e
−βTi − eβTi)− 1
β
∑n
i=1(e
−βTi − e−βTi−1)]
= S(T ) c0
β∆T {−Te
−βT − 1
β
(e−βT − 1)
+ 1
(1−e−β∆T )
[Te−βT −∆Te−β∆T )− (T −∆T )e−β(T+∆T )]}
= S(T ) c0
β2∆T
1
(1−e−β∆T ) [1− e
−β∆T − β∆Te−β∆T ].
That is to say
A(T ) =
c0
β2∆T
1
(1− e−β∆T )
[1− e−β∆T − β∆Te−β∆T ]. (21)
Take Eqs.(18),(19) and (21) into (15), we can get
Proposition 2 Assume the default buyer doesn’t default during the entire contract, and the
default intensities of B (the protection seller) and C(protection buyer) are given by Eq.(3) and (4),
then the swap premium is given by
S(T ) =
bc0
β
(
1
b
+ δ)e−(r+b0)δ[1− e−βT ]× [
e−β∆T (1− e−βT )
1− e−β∆T
+A(T )]−1. (22)
where A(T ) is given by Eq.(21).
Remark 2: Due to
1− e−β∆T − β∆Te−β∆T ≥
1
2
β2∆T 2e−β∆T ,
the swap premium S(T ) is bounded by
S(T ) ≤
bc0
β
(
1
b
+ δ)e−(r+b0)δ
(1− e−βT )(eβ∆T − 1)
c0∆T
2 + 1− e
−βT
Section 4. Conclusion
In this paper, a geometric function is introduced to reflect the attenuation speed of impact
of one firm’s default to its partner. If the two firms are competitions (copartners), the default
intensity of one firm will decrease (increase) abruptly when the other firm defaults. As time goes
on, the impulsion will decrease gradually until extinct. In this model, the joint distribution and
marginal distributions of default times are derived by employing the change of measure, so can we
value the fair swap premium of a CDS and get the analytic expression.
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